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Overcoming Defiance of the Constitution:  
The Need for a Federal Role in Protecting  
the Right to Counsel in Georgia 
 
Stephen B. Bright
*
 and Lauren Sudeall Lucas
**
 
 
All three branches of Georgia’s government have failed in their constitutional 
responsibility to ensure that poor people accused of crimes are effectively represented by 
competent lawyers with the time and resources necessary to provide individualized 
representation, contest the prosecution’s case, and present an adequate defense.  They are not the 
only entities responsible, however, for protecting the rights of indigent criminal defendants in 
Georgia.  The federal government, which has made immense contributions to the prosecution of 
criminal cases in Georgia through grants to law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts, shares 
responsibility for the integrity of Georgia’s criminal justice system and the enforcement of the 
constitutional right to counsel. 
 
Unlike Florida, which created public defender offices in each of its judicial circuits 
within two months of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright1 – the landmark 
case establishing the right to counsel for indigent defendants – Georgia resisted Gideon’s 
mandate for 40 years, leaving the representation of poor people accused of crimes up to each of 
its 159 counties.  Finally, shamed by reports by the media and others of grossly deficient 
representation, and prodded by the admonitions of three chief justices, the report of a blue ribbon 
commission, and numerous lawsuits, the legislature reluctantly created a statewide public 
defender system in 2003.  However, the legislature has never funded the system adequately,
2
 
leaving the major responsibility for the system to the counties.  In addition, the statewide 
program is poorly managed, lacks independence from political interference, and eliminated an 
outstanding training program after its first two years. 
 
While unquestionably an improvement over the fragmented approaches that existed 
before it, the new system has in some cases failed completely to provide representation to some 
indigent defendants and has provided inadequate representation to many others.  Many public 
defenders carry crushing caseloads, often lack the investigative and expert assistance needed to 
represent their clients effectively, and are pressured to represent defendants with conflicting 
interests.  Some capital cases have gone without funding for counsel, investigation, and experts 
for years, making a timely investigation and a fair trial impossible.  Hundreds of defendants in 
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 372 U.S. 335 (1963); ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 212 (1964). 
2
 In fiscal year 2008, for example, Georgia spent only $4.30 per capita on indigent defense.  CLARK D. GRADNEY, 
STATE FUNDING OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SURVEY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.utahstatebar.org/cle/annualconvention/materials/breakout%20CC/State%20Funding.pdf.  By contrast, 
the national average for per capita spending on indigent defense in 2008 was $11.86.  NAT’L LEGAL AID & 
DEFENDER ASS’N (NLADA), A RACE TO THE BOTTOM:  SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRISIS ii (June 2008), available at http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_report.pdf. 
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felony cases have not had any representation – some pre-trial and others on motions for new trial 
and appeal.  And fixed-fee contracts have increasingly been used to provide only nominal 
representation to many other defendants. 
 
The failures of Georgia’s struggling indigent defense system provide a clear 
demonstration of the need for federal assistance and oversight.  This Issue Brief will provide a 
brief history of Georgia’s current public defender system and its deficiencies.  It will then 
describe the impact of those deficiencies on individual defendants.  Finally, it will explore ways 
in which the federal government can play a role in remedying Georgia’s failure to enforce the 
right to counsel by providing grants to improve representation, conditioning grant funding on 
states having an adequate indigent defense system, bringing lawsuits against deficient programs, 
and filing amicus briefs in support of systemic improvements. 
 
I. An Indigent Defense System in Need of Repair:  Georgia’s Refusal to Provide 
Adequately for the Right to Counsel 
 
A. The Beginnings of Georgia’s Statewide Indigent Defense System 
 
After the Gideon decision, Georgia delegated the responsibility and cost for indigent 
defense to each of its 159 counties.  As a result, the method of providing representation varied 
greatly from county to county.  Several counties simply conscripted lawyers to handle criminal 
cases:  every member of the bar, regardless of their area of specialization or years of experience, 
was required to accept indigent criminal case appointments – with or without compensation, 
depending on the jurisdiction.
3
  Some counties contracted with attorneys willing to work for 
minimal compensation; in other counties, judges appointed willing lawyers and counties paid 
them by the case or by the hour at rates far below what lawyers were paid for other work.
4
  Only 
21 counties employed public defender offices composed of full-time, salaried attorneys 
specializing in the representation of poor people accused of crimes.
5
  A common feature of these 
haphazard and underfunded approaches was that they resulted in grossly deficient representation.  
The vice president of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association described in 1985 the “the mirror 
test” used to determine whether a defendant received adequate counsel:  “You put a mirror under 
the court-appointed lawyer’s nose, and if the mirror clouds up, that's adequate counsel.”6 
 
Nearly 40 years later, in December 2000, Georgia Supreme Court Chief Justice Robert 
Benham established a commission to “study the status of indigent defense in Georgia, to develop 
a strategic plan and to set a timetable for its implementation.”7  After two years of hearings and 
study, the Commission reported that there was “insufficient funding” for indigent defense, a lack 
                                                 
 
3
 THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA:  A STUDY FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S 
COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE [hereinafter SPANGENBERG GROUP REPORT] 31–32 (Dec. 12, 2002), available 
at http://www.georgiacourts.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=144&Itemid=28.  As a result, 
lawyers without experience or interest in criminal law simply entered pleas in their clients’ cases.  Id. 
4
 Id. at 35–37; see also MICHAEL B. SHAPIRO, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA:  A REPORT TO THE BLUE RIBBON 
COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 35 (Sept. 19, 2001). 
5
 SHAPIRO, INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA, supra n.4, at 35. 
6
 Hal Strauss, Indigent Legal Defense Called “Terrible,” ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 7, 1985, at 12A. 
7
 REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 1 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idc.html (citing Georgia Supreme Court Order of December 27, 2000). 
3 
of accountability and oversight, and “a complete absence of uniformity in the administration of 
and quality of indigent defense services” in the state.8  The Commission ultimately 
recommended creation of a statewide public defender system organized by judicial circuit, and 
that the state – not the counties – provide adequate funding for indigent defense services.9 
 
The Georgia legislature created such a system through passage of the Indigent Defense 
Act of 2003.10  In 2004, it adopted a number of fines and fees to fund the system,11 and the system 
began operation on January 1, 2005.12  The Indigent Defense Act provided for the representation 
of indigent defendants to be carried out by circuit public defender offices.13  The only exceptions 
were that a few single-county circuits were allowed to opt-out of the system14 and that circuit 
public defender offices were not to represent clients where there was a conflict of interest.15  The 
Act also created a statewide oversight agency, the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council 
(GPDSC), which was charged with the ultimate responsibility to ensure adequate and effective 
legal representation to all indigent persons entitled to such representation.16 
 
Contrary to the recommendation of the Commission, however, the state has not taken full 
responsibility for funding the system.  The counties are still paying 60% of the cost of 
representation.
17
  Moreover, the legislature did not restrict the fund generated by the court filing 
fees and fines adopted in 2004 to indigent defense and has diverted a significant portion of that 
fund to be spent for other purposes.
18
  In the first four years after the system began operations, 
the fund generated $23 million that the legislature did not appropriate to the defense of poor 
people accused of crimes.
19
  In fiscal year 2010, the fund took in $7 million more than the  
                                                 
 
8
 SPANGENBERG GROUP REPORT, supra n.3, at ii; see also REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT 
DEFENSE, supra n.7, at 3–4. 
9
 REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE’S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra n.7, at 5–6. 
10
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-1 (West 2010). 
11
 See H.B. 1EX, 2004 Gen. Assem. Extra. Sess. (describing a $15 increase on all civil filing fees, a 10% surcharge 
to criminal and traffic fines and fees, a 10% surcharge to bonds and bail fines (with a $50 cap), and a $50 fee to 
apply for representation by a public defender). 
12
 See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-12-20–37 (West 2010). 
13
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-23 (West 2010). 
14
 Under the statute, judicial circuits composed of a single county may continue alternative indigent defense service 
delivery systems as long as that system meets certain requirements set forth by the statute.  GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-
36 (West 2010). 
15
 Where the Circuit Public Defender office has a conflict with providing representation to an individual defendant 
either at trial or on appeal, the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council – also created by the same legislation – is 
responsible for establishing a procedure by which alternative legal representation can be provided.  GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-12-22 (West 2010). 
16
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-1 (West 2010). 
17
 Walter C. Jones, Crime costs are hitting taxpayers from multiple angles, ROME (GA.) NEWS TRIBUNE, Mar. 1, 
2010 (noting that state was paying 37% of the cost of indigent defense). 
18
 See Order at 35, n.38, Flournoy v. State, No. 2009CV178947, Fulton County (Ga.) Super. Ct. (Feb. 23, 2010) 
[hereinafter Flournoy Order].   
19
 Id.; see also Ben Smith, Debating indigent defense, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, May 24, 2010, at 1 (quoting 
Emmet Bondurant, first chairman of the Public Defender Standards Council, saying that the legislature had diverted 
$22 million from the fund); STATE BAR OF GEORGIA, INDIGENT DEFENSE PRINCIPLES REVISITED 3, available at 
http://gabar.org/public/pdf/LEG/Revised%20Principles%20Indigent%20Defense.pdf (“In 2007, the State collected 
$43.3 million through the fines and fees enacted pursuant to H.B. 240 but allocated only $36.3 million to indigent 
defense. . . . In each year, the unallocated funds have flowed into the General Revenue fund to be used for purposes 
other than indigent defense.”); C. Wilson Dubose & E. Wycliff Orr, Indigent Defense: System is unfairly under 
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legislature allocated to the public defender system.
20
  As a result, there is still great inconsistency 
in the quality of representation across the state – some counties are unwilling to contribute 
almost anything to their local public defender programs, while others are more generous – and 
many lawyers have been forced to represent clients without adequate compensation or resources. 
 
The fledgling program has also been badly mismanaged and lacks independence.  The 
Act was amended in 2008 so that the director of the GPDSC serves at the pleasure of the 
governor, leaving the Council almost completely powerless.  For the past three years, the director 
has been a former state legislator who is also a timber lawyer, mule trader, and auctioneer.  
Before becoming director, he had no prior background in the representation of poor people 
accused of crimes aside from handling a small number of court-appointed cases.  During his 
tenure, he has neglected completely the two most critical areas needed to build a strong public 
defender program:  recruitment and training.  Faced with a grossly underfunded system, the 
director has pressured public defenders to represent defendants with conflicting interests despite 
the legal and ethical prohibitions of doing so.
21
  Many lawyers are no longer willing to represent 
indigent defendants because, under its current management, the GPDSC has arbitrarily cut 
payments to lawyers, delayed payments for long periods of time, and, on occasion, not 
compensated lawyers at all.
22
  
 
The GPDSC’s director has also made uninformed and misdirected decisions, such as the 
firing of the entire Metro Conflict Defender Office, which provides conflict representation to 
indigent defendants in the metropolitan Atlanta area.
23
  The decision was made with very little 
notice, without consulting the judges, district attorneys, and public defenders in the affected 
judicial circuits, and without making any arrangements for how the clients would be represented.  
Complete chaos was avoided only because the director backed off most of the attorney firings 
once a lawsuit was filed seeking to enjoin his actions.
24
  Filing lawsuits on a case-by-case basis is 
not a sustainable means for ensuring that the rights of all indigent defendants are adequately 
protected, however; such egregious mismanagement cries out for more comprehensive oversight. 
 
B. The Effects of Georgia’s Failures on Its Indigent Defendants 
 
The inadequate funding, mismanagement, and lack of training and recruitment evidenced 
since the advent of Georgia’s statewide system have not only kept Georgia from making up  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
attack, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 16, 2008, at A9 (noting also that “no state tax dollars are used to fund the public 
defender system”). 
20
 Greg Land, $7 million from Indigent Defense Fund routed to state treasury, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT 
ATLAW BLOG, July 8, 2010, available at http://www.atlawblog.com/2010/07/7-million-from-indigent-defense-fund-
routed-to-state-treasury/ (“The funding stream intended to pay for Georgia’s indigent defense system took in $7 
million more than the state allocated to defend the poor in fiscal year 2010[.]”). 
21
 See infra n.81. 
22
 See infra Part I.B.4. 
23
 See Bill Rankin, Council discards defender contracts:  Hiring of low-cost lawyers in Fulton County criticized, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 17, 2009, at C1. 
24
 See Motion to Dismiss at 1-4, People Accused of Crimes and Their Lawyers, et al. v. Crawford, et al., No. 
2008CV151884, Fulton County (Ga.) Sup. Ct., Jan. 16, 2009. 
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for years of neglect of the right to counsel, but have also resulted in further injustices, ranging 
from the wholesale denial of counsel to a willingness to sacrifice the quality of counsel for  
cost considerations. 
 
1. No Counsel at All:  The Denial of Counsel to Defendants Awaiting Trial 
and Appeal 
 
The most obvious manifestation of the various factors mentioned above has been the 
complete denial of counsel to indigent defendants awaiting trial and appeal.  The primary cause 
of this phenomenon is the drastic slashing of budgets for conflict cases – i.e., cases in which the 
public defender is precluded by a conflict of interest from representing an indigent client (for 
example, because the public defender already represents another co-defendant in the same case) 
and therefore the GPDSC must provide alternative representation. 
 
For example, in the Northern Judicial Circuit, a five-county circuit in northeast Georgia, 
the Council reduced the budget for conflict cases in July 2008 from nearly $130,000 to 
approximately $37,000.
25
  As a result, the contracts with attorneys representing defendants 
conflicted from representation by the public defender in that circuit were not renewed.
26
  Two of 
the attorneys were allowed to withdraw from their cases;
27
 the third was not paid and, as a result, 
simply stopped working on his cases.
28
  As a result, hundreds of people – most with felony 
charges – were left pre-trial without representation.29  For some, the time in jail without counsel 
resulted in loss of a job or their home, inability to receive necessary medical treatment, or the 
inability to attend the funeral of a loved one.
30
   
 
Eventually, when faced with a class-action lawsuit on behalf of the hundreds of 
unrepresented defendants without representation,
31
 the GPDSC signed additional contracts with 
lawyers in the circuit to handle a number of cases for a low fixed fee.
32
  On July 8, 2010, two 
years after the lawsuit was filed, it was resolved with a consent order.  The GPDSC agreed to 
contract with lawyers under specific caseload limits (i.e., 125 felony defendants or 300 
misdemeanor defendants).
33
  In findings of fact made to supplement the consent order, the trial 
judge stated:  “The Georgia indigent defense system is broken.”34  
                                                 
 
25
 Bill Rankin, Lawyerless defendants file lawsuit:  Funds or freedom, THE ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 7, 2009, at B1. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Complaint at 15–16, Cantwell v. Crawford, No. 09EV275M, Elbert County (Ga.) Super. Ct., filed Apr. 7, 2009 
[hereinafter Cantwell Complaint]. 
28
 Id. at 16. 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. at 16–17. 
31
 See Rankin, Lawyerless defendants file lawsuit, supra n.25, at B1. 
32
 See Merritt Melancon, Northern Judicial Circuit legal battle not over, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Sept. 4, 2009, 
available at http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/090409/new_489483886.shtml; see also Transcript of Class 
Certification Hearing at 99-100, 148-50, 163-64, 179-80, Cantwell v. Crawford, No. 09EV275M, Elbert County 
(Ga.) Super. Ct. (Mar. 3-4, 2010).  One contract attorney testified that he “was being offered the contract to make 
the Southern Center lawsuit go away.”  Id. at 100. 
33
 Consent Order, Cantwell v. Crawford, No. 09EV275M, Elbert County (Ga.) Super. Ct. (July 8, 2010) [hereinafter 
Cantwell Consent Order] 
34
 Court’s Analysis of Indigent Defense System at 8, Cantwell v. Crawford, No. 09EV275M, Elbert County (Ga.) 
Super. Ct. (July 8, 2010). 
6 
 
Similar violations of the right to counsel have occurred with regard to defendants’ 
motions for new trial and direct appeals – stages at which defendants are just as entitled to 
effective representation as they are at trial.
35
  In Flournoy v. State, filed in December 2009, the 
Southern Center for Human Rights and co-counsel brought a lawsuit on behalf of nearly 200 
individuals across the state who had been denied the assistance of conflict-free counsel on their 
motions for new trial and on appeal.
36
 
 
The GPDSC’s Appellate Division is responsible for providing legal representation for all 
of the conflict criminal appeals across the entire state.
37
  However, due to gross underfunding, its 
staff is not nearly large enough for the task:  since 2008, its staff has consisted of only two full-
time attorneys and one part-time attorney.  It reported in November 2009 a staggering caseload 
of 476 cases and an inability to assign counsel to 187 persons; by January of the next year, the 
Division’s caseload had reached 515, with 191 individuals unrepresented in their motions for 
new trial and on appeal.
38
  Of the 187 individuals without counsel as of December 2009, some 
had been waiting more than three years for counsel to be appointed and many others had been 
waiting at least a year.
39
  The Division contracts with private attorneys to handle some of the 
additional caseload, but it has not been allocated funding sufficient to provide adequate 
representation to all who are entitled to it. 
 
On February 23, 2010, the trial court issued an order in Flournoy granting class 
certification and requiring that the GPDSC provide lawyers to members of the class without 
conflict-free appellate counsel “at the earliest possible opportunity” and no later than 30 days 
after the entry of the order.
40
  The Flournoy litigation is ongoing, however, and the quality of the 
representation to be provided remains to be seen. 
 
The constitutional right to a lawyer is meaningless unless the lawyer is provided when it 
matters – promptly after arrest or, in the case of an appeal, after conviction.  In Georgia, 
however, cost containment has prevailed over fundamental constitutional rights.  With litigation 
as the sole means to compel compliance from such a mismanaged system, the long-term outlook 
for those in need of a lawyer is grim.  Federal oversight and incentives are necessary to increase 
the likelihood of compliance with the right to counsel. 
 
                                                 
 
35
 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Adams v. State, 405 S.E.2d 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). 
36
 Complaint, Flournoy v. State, No. 2009CV178947, Fulton County (Ga.) Super. Ct., filed Dec. 15, 2009 
[hereinafter Flournoy Complaint]. 
37
 Under Georgia law, the courts can no longer make appointments of counsel directly; instead, the GPDSC – and 
through the GPDSC, individual circuit public defender offices – are responsible for the provision of counsel to those 
who are entitled to and yet cannot afford legal representation.  Bynum v. State, 658 S.E.2d 196, 197–98 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2008); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-1 et seq. (West 2010). 
38
 Flournoy Order, supra n.18, at 7–8. 
39
 Flournoy Complaint, supra n.36, at 33; Bill Rankin, Funding short, felons wait years for justice:  Suit challenges 
lack of money for appeals, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 16, 2009, at B4. 
40
 Flournoy Order, supra n.18, at 37.  As to future members of the class – those who will inevitably become part of 
the ever-growing backlog awaiting counsel upon conviction – the court held that effective conflict-free counsel must 
be provided no later than 30 days after the GPDSC receives the request for new counsel.  Id. 
7 
2. Indifference Even When Life is At Stake:  Inadequate Funding of Capital 
Cases in Georgia 
 
Georgia has also failed to provide adequate counsel to people facing the death penalty.  
For much of the state’s history, those accused of capital crimes were assigned incompetent 
lawyers who offered little or no resistance as their clients were swiftly dispatched to death row.
41
 
 
The Georgia Capital Defender Office, which was created by the Indigent Defense Act of 
2003 in part to remedy such poor representation, started in January 2005 with a budget of nearly 
$7.5 million.42  However, the division’s budget was eventually cut in half43 – despite the $2.3 
million cost of the defense in State v. Brian Nichols, a capital case involving an escape from 
custody and the murder of a judge, court reporter, and sheriff’s deputy, followed by the murder of 
a federal agent44 – rendering the adequate defense of capital cases in Georgia nearly impossible.45 
 
Today, attorneys in the Capital Defender Office have had to significantly increase their 
caseloads in order to handle all the cases assigned to the office, and the budget allowed for 
capital cases staffed by private lawyers falls far short of what is necessary to provide effective 
representation.  There is currently only one attorney employed to handle all of the capital appeals 
across the state.  Several capital defendants in Georgia have been deprived of funds for counsel, 
investigative assistance, and expert assistance for years while waiting for their capital murder 
trials.  For example, in 2005, Stacey Sims was charged with multiple counts of murder in Tift 
County, Georgia; the state chose to seek the death penalty in Sims’s case.46  Two lawyers were 
appointed to represent Sims, but they withdrew a year and a half later because they had not been 
paid.
47
  Two new lawyers were appointed to represent Sims, but another year and a half later, 
they also withdrew because they also had not been paid.
48
  Sims was eventually appointed 
                                                 
 
41
 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not For the Worst Crime But For the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1839, 1841 n.45, 1843 (1994); Marcia Coyle et al., Trial and Error in the 
Nation's Death Belt: Fatal Defense, NAT’ L.J., v.12, n.40 (June 11, 1990), at 30, 34; Jeanne Cummings, Bad 
Lawyers Tip the Scales of Justice Toward Death Row, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 1, 1990, at A1.  See also 
SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMISES TO KEEP:  ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE 
POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES 10–12 (2000). 
42
 Reply Brief for Appellant at 7 n.9, Weis v. State, No. S09A1951 (Ga. Oct. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Weis Reply 
Brief]. 
43
 See id. (budget reduced to $4.3 million for the capital defender office’s second year); see also Bill Rankin & 
Cameron McWhirter, Nichols trial leaves deep footprint on state courts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 12, 2008, at A8. 
44
 Nichols is now serving a life sentence in prison without the possibility of parole.  Bill Rankin, Reversal on new 
legal aid system?  Responsibility for some indigent defense could return to counties, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 6, 
2010, at A1; see also Adam Liptak, Defendants Squeezed by Georgia‟s Tight Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 6, 2010, at 
A13 (noting that the Nichols prosecution “drained most of the new [capital defender] office’s budget”). 
45
 See Brenda Goodman, Georgia Murder Case‟s Cost Saps Public Defense System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/22/us/22atlanta.html?scp=1&sq=georgia+murder+case%27s+cost+saps+public+d
efense+system&st=nyt (reporting that “[a] high-profile multiple-murder case has drained the budget of Georgia’s 
public defender system and brought all but a handful of its 72 capital cases to a standstill”). 
46
 Bill Rankin, Can Georgia afford the death penalty?  State public defender system‟s lack of funds held up trial for 
2 years, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 11, 2009, at A1. 
47
 Weis Reply Brief, supra n.42, at 45 n.54 (citing Hearing in Sims v. State, No. 2006-CR-91, Tift County (Ga.) 
Superior Court (Dec. 22, 2008)). 
48
 Id. 
8 
another set of lawyers from the state Capital Defender Office and the case was resolved in 
August 2010 with an agreement that Sims would serve six concurrent life sentences with the 
possibility of parole. 
 
Jamie Weis, another capital defendant in Georgia, has been without legal representation 
for years due to the state’s failure to provide adequate funding for his defense.  Weis was 
arrested February 2, 2006, in Pike County, Georgia.
49
  The prosecution filed its notice of intent to 
seek death in August 2006, yet death-qualified counsel did not enter their appearance until 
October 12, 2006.
50
  Funding ran out the following March and Weis was without funds for his 
representation until July 2009.
51
  When his lawyers were unable to prepare his defense without 
the assistance of investigators and experts, the district attorney moved to replace them – even 
though they had represented Weis for over a year – with two local public defenders.  The state’s 
motion was subsequently granted.
52
  The public defenders sought unsuccessfully to withdraw, 
representing to the trial court in one of three motions that they “lack[ed] the time and expertise to 
conduct the extensive investigation that is necessary,” “remain[ed] overburdened with their 
current caseloads,” and could not “under the current state of affairs, perform adequately in 
representing the Defendant, no matter how good our intentions or diligent our efforts.”53  The 
public defenders also explained that they had been unable to obtain necessary funds for experts, 
investigation, and travel.
54
  Weis eventually secured representation by his original counsel after 
filing a mandamus action against the judge,
55
 but the GPDSC still provided no funds for his 
defense until July 2009, when it agreed to provide “a significantly reduced amount from the 
amount that counsel believed was necessary in order to provide an adequate defense.”56 
 
Weis’s lawyers filed a pre-trial appeal in the Georgia Supreme Court in September 2009, 
arguing that his rights to counsel and to a speedy trial had been violated.
57
  In a 4-3 decision, the 
Court rejected Weis’s arguments, holding that that he and his lawyers were responsible for most 
of the delays, given their refusal to accept the assistance of the public defenders.
58
  The majority 
also found that because the public defenders were appointed – even though they made it clear 
they were not capable of representing Weis in a capital case – there was no “breakdown in the 
public defender system,” which has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as a basis for a 
speedy trial violation.
59
  Three justices dissented, stating: “The failure to move this case forward 
                                                 
 
49
 Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. 2010); Rankin, Can Georgia afford the death penalty?, supra n.46, at A1. 
50
 Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 353, 359 (Thompson, J., dissenting); see id. at 360 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[t]he prosecution took an inordinate amount of time to decide whether to seek the death penalty”).  
51
 Id. at 353-54; see also Rankin, Can Georgia afford the death penalty?, supra n.46, at A1. 
52
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 Weis, 694 S.E.2d at 353. 
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 Id. at 353-54. 
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 Id. at 354; see also id. at 360 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting that the GPDSC provided funds “on the eve of 
trial and at a steep discount, leaving Weis with little time and no real ability to mount a defense”). 
57
 Id. at 352.  
58
 Id. at 352, 354-57. 
59
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is the direct result of the government’s unwillingness to meet its constitutional obligation to 
provide Weis with legal counsel and the funds necessary for a full investigation.”60 
 
In Phan v. State,
61
 the Georgia Supreme Court applied its decision in Weis to do even 
greater violence to the constitutional right to counsel.  The capital case against Khanh Dinh Phan 
had been pending for over five years without proceeding to trial because the GPDSC has been 
unable to provide funds for attorneys, investigators, and expert witnesses.
62
  The GPDSC 
originally agreed to pay Phan’s lawyers $125 per hour, but reduced the amount to $95 per hour, 
and then did not pay them at all after August 30, 2008.
63
  It also refused to fund an investigation 
that the GPDSC itself recognized as constitutionally required.
64
   
 
On a pretrial appeal of a speedy trial issue, the Georgia Supreme Court, in another 4-3 
decision, remanded the case to the trial court to consider alternatives to ensure Phan effective 
representation, including the possibility of appointing alternative counsel.
65
  On remand, the trial 
court in Phan – although it has already found that there is no funding available for defense 
representation in capital cases
66
 – is to seek out lawyers who will work for nothing or next to 
nothing and who can somehow represent their client in accordance with recognized performance 
standards, even without resources for necessary expert and investigative assistance.
67
  Obviously, 
this will be an impossible task. 
 
In an effort to speed things along, and in light of the lack of available funding, the 
majority in Phan also instructed the trial court to consider superficial alternatives – “such as 
phone or internet interviews of witnesses” – to the investigation needs proposed by Phan’s 
counsel for the guilt-innocence and penalty phases of the trial.
68
  However, a thorough 
investigation requires following leads, surveying the physical environment in which the client 
developed,
69
 talking to people who may not be available by telephone or internet,
70
 repeated in-
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70
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murders with which Phan is charged fled to Vietnam and all of Phan’s family lives there.  Phan, 2010 WL 2553467 
at *1. 
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person interviews,
71
 assessing the impact that witnesses will have on the jury, and preparation of 
the witnesses for direct and cross examination. 
 
For poor people facing the ultimate punishment in Georgia, lawyers have become 
fungible and subject to replacement at any time based on cost considerations.  A defense lawyer 
who suggests that a true investigation is needed can be swapped for a lawyer who will not 
investigate or will conduct only a superficial investigation.  The substitution of less qualified 
counsel without sufficient resources not only undermines the relationship between attorney and 
client, but also deprives the defendant of a thorough investigation
72
 while counsel is not 
appointed or funds are not available.  This may result in the loss of valuable evidence or 
witnesses and cause irreparable harm to a defendant’s case.  Faced repeatedly with such flagrant 
violations of the right to counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court has not only refused to provide a 
remedy, but decreed that capital trials will move forward despite the refusal of the legislature to 
provide the funding for a competent defense for those facing the ultimate penalty. 
 
3. Outsourcing Injustice:  The Use of Flat-Fee Contracts 
 
Before 2005, many jurisdictions in Georgia contracted with lawyers to handle all of their 
indigent criminal cases for a fixed fee.  The creation of the public defender system was supposed 
to drastically minimize or end the use of such contracts.  However, because it has never 
adequately funded its system, Georgia has continued to use contracts and, when the funding for 
conflict cases was drastically reduced in 2008, greatly increased their use.  It has primarily used 
such contracts to provide lawyers in cases where the public defender offices cannot provide 
representation due to a conflict of interest. 
 
Most contracts executed by the GPDSC provide that the flat sum provided to the  
attorney is to compensate her not only for her time, but also for necessary investigators, expert 
witnesses, overhead, and other incidental expenses – such as copying volumes of criminal or 
medical records – thus creating disincentives for the lawyer to spend resources on investigation 
and expert assistance.  The contracts also typically allow the lawyers to maintain private 
practices, creating motivation to dispose of their indigent clients’ cases as quickly as possible, 
since they will be paid the same amount regardless of the time spent and the quality of 
representation provided. 
 
                                                 
 
71
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step of “interviewing witnesses” or requesting records); William M. Bowen, Jr., A Former Alabama Appellate 
Judge‟s Perspective on the Mitigation Function in Capital Cases, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 814 (2008) (describing 
the importance of “in-person, face-to-face, one-on-one interviews with . . . the client’s family, and other witnesses 
who are familiar with the client’s life, history, or family history” and the need for “multiple interviews” with some 
witnesses “to establish trust, elicit sensitive information” (citation omitted)); American Bar Association, GUIDELINES 
FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEF. COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 10.7 – 
Investigation & Commentary to Guideline 10.7, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1015-26 (2003) (discussing 
need for interviews of client and various witnesses by defense counsel, the investigator, the mitigation specialist, and 
other members of the defense team). 
72
 Porter, 130 S. Ct. at 452-53; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 525 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
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In Cantwell – the case litigated by the Southern Center for Human Rights in the Northern 
Judicial Circuit – attorneys signed contracts for $50,000 a year in exchange for handling 175 
cases – a rate of compensation that breaks down to approximately $285 per case.73  One of the 
attorneys who had signed such a contract not only maintained a private practice, but also served 
as an appointed public defender in seven municipal courts and as a juvenile court judge in the 
circuit.
74
  He testified at a hearing in March 2010 that when he signed the contract to take on 175 
cases, the GPDSC did not inquire as to his existing workload.
75
 
 
In response to the lawsuit filed in Flournoy v. State, discussed above, the GPDSC 
executed contracts with ten different attorneys.  Each contract provided for the attorneys to take 
on a certain number of cases for a fixed fee – $1,200 to $1,500 per case.76  Prior to executing the 
contracts, the GPDSC did not tell the lawyers anything about the cases they would be assigned, 
so they had no basis on which to evaluate whether the rate of compensation provided by the 
contracts would allow them to provide effective representation in those cases.
77
 
 
GPDSC’s Appellate Division Director estimated at a hearing in February 2010 that the 
average motion for new trial and direct appeal – under the contracts, attorneys would assume 
responsibility for both – require approximately 140 hours of attorney time, excluding time for 
travel.
78
  At the rate of compensation for which they had contracted, the attorneys would 
effectively be working for $8.57 to $10.71 per hour, depending on whether they were being paid 
$1,200 or $1,500 per case.
79
  In addition, the attorneys agreed to seek no more than $150 in 
travel reimbursement (when their assigned cases could require them to travel anywhere in the 
state) and no more than $150 in reimbursement for expert assistance and other incidental 
expenses.  They agreed to these limits without having any idea as to the nature of the cases or 
whether expert assistance would be needed.  Based on this information and other evidence 
presented over the course of the hearing, the trial court found that: 
 
Given the low rate of total compensation and the significant 
limitations placed on reimbursement of expert and other expenses, 
it is highly unlikely, if not practically impossible, for an attorney to 
provide effective representation to the named Plaintiffs and other 
class members under such a contractual arrangement.  To the 
contrary, an attorney has a strong economic disincentive to 
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perform a thorough investigation and develop and present the 
substantial evidence often required to prevail in a motion for new 
trial.  The inadequacy of compensation and the disincentives 
created by these arrangements raises a serious doubt that an 
attorney can provide effective assistance without suffering severe 
financial detriment or sacrifice.
80
 
 
Low rates of compensation and a lack of other resources provided to contract attorneys 
result in an intractable conflict of interest between the client’s interest in adequate representation 
and the attorney’s personal and financial interests.  Flat fee contracts to represent a large number 
of defendants should therefore be avoided.  If a jurisdiction must resort to contracts for conflict 
cases or other unique reasons (as in rural areas where there are few cases and few lawyers), there 
must be adequate compensation for the representation and clear restrictions on simultaneously-
maintained private caseloads and on the number of cases handled under the contract, as well as 
adequate provisions made for investigative and expert assistance, to ensure that representation 
provided under such contracts meets basic constitutional and ethical requirements. 
 
4. Selling Out:  Compromising Ethical and Professional Standards to Meet 
Budgetary Limitations 
 
As necessary resources have been withheld from Georgia’s indigent defense system, 
ethical, professional, and constitutional standards regarding a lawyer’s representation of multiple 
co-defendants and duty to decline representation when his or her workload makes it impossible 
to provide competent representation
81
 have given way to cost control measures.  The same 
pressure to control costs has manifested in overwhelming caseloads for public defenders and a 
failure to compensate private contract counsel for work they have already performed. 
 
In cases involving multiple defendants, cases may be resolved with one defendant 
agreeing to testify against another or a lawyer may argue for more lenient treatment based on the 
relative culpability of the defendants.  Constitutional and ethical rules protect the interests of the 
accused in cases involving multiple defendants.
82
  Although the overwhelming majority of 
criminal cases end in guilty pleas, such rules make no distinction between cases that are resolved 
pre-trial and those that proceed to trial.  Nevertheless, many circuit public defenders offices in 
Georgia have – under pressure from the GPDSC – simultaneously represented defendants with 
conflicting interests as a cost-saving measure.
83
  Public defender offices have been urged to 
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“hold” conflict cases for as long as possible before declaring a conflict in the hope that cases will 
be resolved with plea bargains.  But the resolution of a case by plea bargain does not mean that 
there is no conflict.  Moreover, if a conflict is finally declared, the entire public defender office 
may be disqualified due to knowledge it has of all of the affected defendants’ cases.  It may also 
take time to find conflict-free representation for the defendants, who may already have been 
prejudiced by the conflicted representation. 
 
Originally, the GPDSC had several conflict defender offices, which employed full-time 
lawyers, investigators, and support staff to provide representation to co-defendants with 
conflicting interests on a cost-effective basis.
84
  In addition, during the first few years of its 
existence, the GPDSC assigned lawyers to conflict cases and paid them by the hour ($60 for in-
court work and $45 for out-of-court work).
85
  Even when lawyers were being paid by the hour, 
however, they were not fully paid for the work they did.  The former conflicts director for the 
GPDSC told a legislative committee that he “arbitrarily” cut the amount paid to conflict 
attorneys by $429,000,
86
 simply because there were not sufficient funds to pay the lawyers what 
they had earned.
87
  In some cases, cuts led to lawyers who had agreed to work for $45 or more 
per hour being compensated at the rate of only $14 per hour.
88
  As a result, some underpaid 
lawyers withdrew from their cases, leaving indigent defendants without representation.
89
  After 
the legislature significantly cut the already inadequate funding for representation in conflict 
cases, the GPDSC closed some of its conflict defender offices and made cutbacks to others.
90
  
 
 
 
The legislature’s refusal to provide adequate funding has also exacerbated the situation of 
public defender offices across the state.  One Georgia public defender resigned in 2009 because 
she felt that she was “not providing effective representation to [her] clients. . . . due to 
overwhelming caseloads, being required to represent clients with conflicting interests, a woefully 
insufficient budget for experts, lack of adequate training and supervision and an insufficient 
investigative staff with little to no training.”91  In just 13 months, she closed approximately 900 
cases and carried approximately 270 cases at any given time.
92
  The crushing caseloads 
maintained by attorneys in the office forced them to ration out the office’s “meager resources” to 
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just a few cases following a “cursory review.”93  The budgetary constraints placed on the office 
resulted in an ethically-dubious approach to conflicts (except in serious felony cases, attorneys 
were instructed not to withdraw from cases “even where an obvious conflict existed”); expert 
funding being limited to exceptional cases; and overwhelming caseloads.
94
 
 
In short, the unavailability of funding for indigent defense has resulted not only in the 
failure to provide counsel in some instances, but also in the compromising of standards that exist 
to protect clients.  Rather than fund the system adequately or explore alternative cost savings, 
widely accepted standards for professional ethics and caseloads limitations have been ignored 
because the state is unwilling to commit the resources for the system to run as it should and 
because there is no oversight or incentive structure to encourage the state to comply with its 
constitutional responsibilities. 
 
II. The Need for Federal Oversight of Indigent Defense 
 
It has become apparent far beyond Georgia’s borders that indigent defense services in the 
United States remain in a perpetual “state of crisis.”95  In addition to making fewer lawyers 
available to provide such representation, many states, including Georgia, have forced attorneys 
to carry excessive caseloads, failed to provide attorneys with resources to provide for an 
adequate defense, allowed significant delays in the appointment of counsel, and neglected to 
adequately train and supervise attorneys handling indigent criminal cases. 
 
The cuts made to already inadequate indigent defense budgets across the country have 
had a severe impact on the rights of persons charged with crimes and who cannot afford a 
lawyer.  In some cases, it has affected the quality of representation, while in others it has 
prevented them from receiving representation at all.  Although many state budgets may have 
been cut across the board, prosecution agencies have continued to benefit from significant 
federal financial assistance.  For fiscal year 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) proposed a 
budget of $3.4 billion in federal funding for state, local, and tribal law enforcement programs.
96
  
Two and a half million dollars would be set aside to fund Access to Justice and Rule of Law 
activities in the DOJ that, in part, include a commitment to “ensur[e] indigent defense,”97 but 
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only $1.3 million – or less than 0.04% of the total federal funding set aside for state law 
enforcement – would be specifically directed to indigent defense programs.98  In 2008, President 
George W. Bush signed legislation that would provide $4.75 million a year to the Ernest F. 
Hollings National Advocacy Center, a specialized school in South Carolina that trains 
prosecutors.
99
  Congress has yet to provide parallel funding to train public defenders. 
 
The generosity of federal grants programs over the years and the unwillingness of states 
to fund adequately programs for providing representation to poor people accused of crimes has 
resulted in many parts of the country in systems that are completely imbalanced.  There is simply 
no adversary system.  The public defenders and court-appointed lawyers with their crushing 
caseloads and limited resources simply have no chance against the overwhelming resources of 
the prosecution and law enforcement.  The federal government should not exacerbate existing 
imbalances and it should not be funding law enforcement agencies and prosecutors who operate 
in jurisdictions that do not have a properly working adversary system. 
 
The federal government could take an active role in improving state-run indigent defense 
programs by:  (1) making grants directly to state or public interest programs demonstrating best 
practices or attached to certain minimum requirements regarding training, caseloads, and 
supervision; (2) conditioning funds awarded to law enforcement and prosecution agencies on a 
showing that the indigent defense system has reached a satisfactory level of functioning; and 
(3) establishing a National Center for Defense Services, similar to the Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC).  The federal government has funded training, but its limited value in a 
system that suffers from such great deficiencies must be recognized.  The federal government 
could also seek the authority to bring lawsuits to compel states to comply with the Sixth 
Amendment and support private litigation efforts by filing of amicus briefs.  All of these tools 
will likely be necessary to vindicate the Constitution in states like Georgia where improvements 
were slow in coming and are still woefully inadequate almost 50 years after Gideon was decided. 
 
A. Grants to State Indigent Defense Programs 
 
The most direct means of assistance would be for the federal government to make grants 
available to state agencies or public interest programs providing indigent defense services or 
allocate a specific portion of existing grant funds to that purpose.  Such grants could be 
conditioned on a state’s demonstrated ability to provide those services through a system that 
meets certain requirements.
100
  In addition to providing a much needed financial infusion and 
forcing states to provide defendants with constitutionally-compliant representation, the 
conditions attached to such federal funds could provide a needed incentive for states to 
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reevaluate how they currently allocate their own budgets, potentially resulting in the choice to 
redirect funds from jails and prisons (amidst all of its funding troubles, Georgia maintains  
the fourth-highest incarceration rate in the nation
101
) to indigent defense and affordable 
sentencing alternatives. 
 
To provide one example, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) has provided grants to 
support resource centers like the Arizona Capital Representation Project, which provides direct 
representation to indigent persons facing the death penalty, but also provides other lawyers in 
Arizona with consulting services, education, and training.
102
  The resource center model is one 
that has worked well by demonstrating best practices and serving as an on-the-ground resource 
for lawyers providing representation to those accused of crimes. 
 
There is no question that the federal government can condition funds on compliance with 
its own policy objectives – including grants conditioned on related system requirements.103  The 
Innocence Protection Act, which was part of the Justice for All Act of 2004, authorized grants to 
states – $375 million over five years – to improve the quality of representation for indigent 
defendants in capital cases at the trial, appellate, and post-conviction levels.
104
  In addition to 
requiring recipients to maintain an “effective” system of capital representation, including training 
programs for lawyers appointed to represent capital defendants and adopting and implementing 
minimum standards for the appointment of prosecutors and defense counsel in capital cases, the 
Act also subjects states to a federal compliance assessment and requires the Attorney General to 
develop corrective action plans for states determined to be non-compliant.
105
 
 
Aside from specifically conditioning funds, the federal government has the power to 
ensure that funds such as those distributed through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant (JAG) Program,
106
 discussed below, are more equitably distributed among 
prosecution and defense agencies.  In fiscal year 1999, for example, of the almost $500 million 
in JAG grants (formerly known as Byrne grants) awarded to states, only 1.4% of the funds were 
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granted to defender programs.
107
  In 32 states, public defense programs received no such funding 
at all.
108
  Southern states have historically allocated the least amount of JAG grant funds to 
defender programs, in both dollars and as a percentage of total state JAG grant awards.
109
  To 
avoid such a stark disparity, Congress could require of states (as a condition of receiving funds) 
that a certain amount of funding be allocated to indigent defense, as well as that the state system 
for providing indigent defense satisfy minimum requirements.  
 
B. Conditions on Grants to Law Enforcement and Prosecution Agencies 
 
Just as funds granted to public defense systems can be conditioned on certain 
requirements, funds granted to law enforcement and prosecution agencies can also be subject to 
conditions.  For example, Congress has granted other funds to state entities for a specific purpose 
only where the state has demonstrated the ability to provide for fair process in the system in 
which such funds will be utilized.  Under the Justice for All Act of 2004, the Attorney General is 
empowered to make grants “to provide training, technical assistance, education, and information 
relating to the identification, collection, preservation, analysis, and use of DNA samples and 
DNA evidence” by law enforcement and corrections personnel, among others.110  To be eligible 
to receive such incentive grants, states are required to have in place or to enact statutes affording 
reasonable process to those seeking post-conviction DNA testing and ensuring the proper 
preservation of DNA evidence.
111
 
 
BJA awards grants to state and local law enforcement and prosecution agencies through 
the JAG program to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system.
112
  The JAG program 
is intended to support a wide range of program areas, including law enforcement, prosecution, 
and courts; prevention and education; corrections and community corrections; drug treatment 
and enforcement; planning, evaluation, and technology improvement; and crime victim and 
witness initiatives.
113
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available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/103.pdf. 
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 42 U.S.C. § 3751.  Inclusion of “indigent defense” as a specific program area for funding – it is currently not part 
of the programs specified in 42 U.S.C. § 3751(a)(1) – would go a long way toward emphasizing the equal 
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There are already various reporting requirements tied to JAG grants.  Congress could also 
require that, in order to be eligible to receive specific grants, states must meet certain standards 
with regard to their indigent defense programs, including the prompt assignment of counsel after 
arrest, manageable caseloads, adequate resources, independence, structure, training, and 
compliance with professional ethical standards.  This would assure that systems that receive 
grants are functioning properly under constitutional and professional standards.  Moreover, the 
benefit of this approach comes at no additional cost to the federal government; it can distribute 
the same levels of grant money while requiring much more of the recipients. 
 
 There will be tremendous resistance by state law enforcement, district attorneys, and 
attorneys general to any conditions being placed on the grants that they receive from DOJ.  For 
years, they have received millions of dollars with little or no accountability.  Things must 
change, but that change can be gradual:  conditions may be phased in over time so that states 
have ample warning of what is expected of them, or states and local jurisdictions might first be 
required to report on the state of their indigent defense systems before being required to certify 
that they meet certain minimum standards.  But the federal government should not continue to 
give billions of dollars to criminal justice systems with no assurance that those systems have 
functioning adversary systems or that they produce just and reliable results. 
 
C. Funding A National Center for Defense Services 
 
The federal government should also establish an independent entity similar to the Legal 
Services Corporation through which federal funding would be provided to states to improve 
indigent defense services pursuant to standards ensuring independence, structure, training, 
supervision, competent management, and other essential elements of effective representation. 
 
The LSC is a non-profit organization that was created in 1974 to promote equal access to 
justice and provide quality civil legal assistance to low-income Americans.
114
  The LSC currently 
awards grants to legal services providers through a competitive grant process, conducts 
compliance reviews and program visits to oversee program quality and compliance with all 
relevant requirements and restrictions, and provides training and technical assistance to 
programs.  The federal government provided nearly $400 million in 2009 to the LSC, even 
though there is no right to counsel in civil cases.
115
  Yet, in the criminal context, Congress has 
not enacted comparable legislation to assist states in cases where there is a constitutionally-
mandated right to counsel.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
importance of prosecution and defense.  As a practical matter, the majority of JAG grants are distributed to state and 
local law enforcement and aimed at crime prevention and control rather than the provision of indigent defense.  THE 
2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, SMART ON CRIME:  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT 
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 143-44 (Nov. 5, 2008), available at 
http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=80 (noting 
that “[h]istorically, states have allocated either none of their JAG funding or only a miniscule portion to public 
defense programs, directing a vastly greater share to law enforcement and prosecutorial programs”). 
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 Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996. 
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 Kemper, supra n.99, at 6; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED, supra n.95, at 200.   
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To fill that gap, some have proposed an independent, adequately-funded National Center 
for Defense Services (NCDS) with a mission to “strengthen the services of publicly funded 
defender programs in all states by providing grants, sponsoring pilot projects, supporting 
training, conducting research, and collecting and analyzing data.”116  The creation of the NCDS 
would disseminate sorely needed federal funding aimed at improving representation to meet the 
standards established by the American Bar Association (ABA), lead to increased transparency, 
provide continuous monitoring and oversight of state and local indigent defense programs, and 
support those programs in improving representation for their clients and the operation of their 
programs in all regards. 
 
Others have suggested an Office of Public Counsel Services within DOJ that would 
formulate a long-term plan for federal support of state and local indigent defense systems, 
develop standards by which indigent defense systems could be evaluated, provide technical 
assistance and training to state and local jurisdictions to assist them in implementing such 
standards, administer federal indigent defense grants, and collect, analyze, and disseminate 
relevant indigent defense data.  Because of the Department’s involvement in the prosecution of 
cases, however, the interests of those accused in effective representation would be best served by 
an independent agency that is concerned solely about defendants’ best interests and not about 
obtaining convictions. 
 
D. The Limits of Training 
 
 Training is often put forward as the answer to all the problems of indigent defense.  BJA 
has funded many excellent training programs, including a recent grant to the ABA to work on a 
National Indigent Defense Training and Technical Assistance Project, which will develop 
recommendations for providing training and technical assistance within indigent defense 
systems.
117
  This is a step in the right direction, but training will not help lawyers carrying 
excessive caseloads – sometimes as high as 300 to 500 cases – who do not have the assistance of 
an investigator or funds for an expert.  Given the conditions under which they are operating, 
some public defenders and contract lawyers are simply not capable of providing effective 
representation no matter how much training they receive.  Training is important and it is 
important that state public defender programs develop outstanding training for their lawyers.  But 
the problems faced by struggling indigent defense programs will not be solved by training alone, 
particularly training developed and provided only at a national or regional level. 
 
E. Other Solutions 
 
There are other ways that the federal government – and particularly DOJ – could provide 
assistance to failing indigent defense systems across the country.  The Department’s Civil Rights 
Division could file amicus briefs in support of plaintiffs challenging deficient indigent defense 
systems, emphasizing the need to protect their constitutional rights.  If given the authority by 
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Congress,
118
 DOJ could initiate pattern and practice lawsuits in states where indigent defense 
systems are inadequate.  In addition to providing DOJ with authority to bring its own lawsuits, 
Congress could also allow the Department to “deputize” private litigants to file lawsuits on 
behalf of the United States.
119
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The Indigent Defense Commission created by the Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme 
Court in 2000 identified several elements that are essential to a successful indigent defense 
program.  Today, Georgia has achieved only one – structure.  It continues to lack other  
critical features such as sufficient resources, independence, proper management, effective 
recruitment, and a comprehensive training and continuing legal education program.  Until 
Georgia fully integrates all of these elements into its indigent defense system, it will continue to 
fail in its constitutional obligation to provide effective legal representation for its indigent 
criminal defendants. 
 
Georgia’s legislature has not only been unwilling to fund a system to provide competent 
counsel for those accused of crimes; it has diverted millions of dollars from the fund it created 
for indigent defense to other purposes.  Georgia’s elected trial judges have presided over 
proceedings at which defendants were not represented in clear violation of Gideon and Georgia’s 
Supreme Court, whose justices are also elected, has urged trial courts to disregard ongoing 
attorney-client relationships and find other, cheaper lawyers when the state fails to adequately 
fund the defense.  The director of the GPDSC, which now operates as part of the executive 
branch, has allowed indigent defendants to be represented by lawyers who are in no position to 
provide effective assistance or to go without counsel altogether.  All three branches of Georgia’s 
government have completely abdicated their constitutional and moral responsibility to protect the 
right to counsel. 
 
Federal involvement and oversight will be required to achieve the level of representation 
required by the Constitution because states like Georgia are not willing to solve this problem on 
their own.  Policies favoring cost containment cannot override the right to counsel, and the 
federal government should not allow that to happen as long as it shares responsibility for 
ensuring state compliance with the Constitution.  Unless the federal government enforces the 
right to counsel through measures requiring states like Georgia to fundamentally reconceive the 
way in which they provide indigent defense services, it is unlikely that those states will ever 
meet their constitutional responsibilities.  The cost will be enormous in terms of wrongful 
convictions, uninformed sentencing, and a criminal justice system that lacks both credibility  
and legitimacy. 
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